


















Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with
Budget-Additive Valuations
Jugal Garg∗ Martin Hoefer† Kurt Mehlhorn‡
Abstract
We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the Nash social wel-
fare when allocating indivisible items to agents with budget-additive valuation functions. Budget-
additive valuations represent an important class of submodular functions. They have attracted a
lot of research interest in recent years due to many interesting applications. For every ε > 0, our
algorithm obtains a (2.404 + ε)-approximation in time polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Our algorithm relies on rounding an approximate equilibrium in a linear Fisher market where
sellers have earning limits (upper bounds on the amount of money they want to earn) and buyers
have utility limits (upper bounds on the amount of utility they want to achieve). In contrast to
markets with either earning or utility limits, these markets have not been studied before. They
turn out to have fundamentally different properties.
Although the existence of equilibria is not guaranteed, we show that the market instances arising
from the Nash social welfare problem always have an equilibrium. Further, we show that the set
of equilibria is not convex, answering a question of [17]. We design an FPTAS to compute an
approximate equilibrium, a result that may be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental problems in markets is to allocate a heterogeneous set of indivisible
items to a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation for the received items. Over the last
decades, variants of this problem have attracted an enormous amount of research interest in economics,
computer science, and operations research. The problem captures basic assignment tasks that arise
in many applications, e.g., when assigning goods to customers in online markets or resources to users
in computer networks. The predominant approach in algorithmic research concerns optimization of
social welfare: Allocate items to maximize the sum of valuations. Over the last two decades, a
rich understanding of algorithms for optimizing and approximating social welfare has been derived
(e.g., [10, 22,23,26,31,35,46] and many more).
Social welfare follows a utilitarian approach to aggregate the valuations of agents, and it has
several drawbacks. Most prominently, social welfare tends to assign items only to the agents with
high numerical values, and as such can determine a highly unfair allocation. Towards this end, several
works have started to consider an egalitarian approach by optimization of max-min fairness: Allocate
items to maximize the minimum of valuations. For a restricted variant of additive valuations (termed
the Santa Claus problem) there has been significant progress in terms of improved approximation
algorithms (e.g., [4, 5, 7, 14,29] and more).
Social welfare and max-min fairness represent two extremes on a spectrum of aggregation methods.
While social welfare tends to focus only on highest-valued agents, max-min fairness tends to focus only
on the smallest-valued agent. An interesting trade-off between these extremal objectives is the Nash
social welfare: Allocate items to maximize the geometric mean of valuations. It has been proposed
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in the classic game theory literature by Nash [37] when solving the bargaining problem. It is closely
related to the notion of proportional fairness studied in networking [30] – in contrast to both social
welfare and max-min fairness it is invariant to individual scaling of each agent valuation with a possibly
different constant factor. Moreover, for divisible items the optimal Nash social welfare is achieved via
the classic fairness notion of competitive equilibrium with equal incomes [36].
The algorithmic problem of allocating indivisible items to maximize the Nash social welfare is far
from being well-understood. Only recently, it has started to attract significant research interest in the
literature on approximation algorithms. The problem is known to be NP- [38] and APX-hard [32], even
for additive valuations. As a remarkable result, Cole and Gkatzelis [18] gave the first constant-factor
approximation algorithm for additive valuations, where the constant was recently improved to 2 [17].
Constant-factor approximation algorithms for additive valuations can also be obtained using methods
from the domain of stable polynomials [1]. Moreover, these algorithms have been extended to provide
a 2-approximation in multi-unit markets with agent valuations, which remain additive-separable over
items [9], but might be concave in the number of copies received for each item [2].
In this paper, we provide the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the maximum Nash
social welfare in markets with a class of non-separable submodular valuation functions. In particular,
we show how to obtain in polynomial time a (2e1/(2e)+ε)-approximation for budget-additive valuation
functions, for any constant ε > 0. These valuations are given by non-negative numbers vij ≥ 0 for
every agent i and item j, as well as a utility cap ci > 0 for every agent i. The valuation of agent i for
any subset S of items is vi(S) = min(ci,
∑
j∈S vij).
The analysis of budget-additive valuations significantly advances our understanding beyond additive-
separable and towards submodular ones. The handling of non-separability requires several new insights
and techniques that we explain in detail below. Moreover, budget-additive valuations are of interest
in a variety of applications, most prominently in online advertising [33, 34]. They have been stud-
ied frequently in the literature, e.g., for offline social welfare maximization [3, 6, 15, 43], online algo-
rithms [11,20], mechanism design [12], Walrasian equilibrium [27,41], and market equilibrium [8,17].
Contribution and Techniques Our main contribution is the first constant-factor approximation
algorithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations. We obtain an
approximation factor of (2e1/(2e)+ε) in polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0. We also show a lower
bound of
√
8/7 > 1.069 for approximating the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations,
unless P=NP. The best previous result was a lower bound of 1.00008 derived for additive valuations [32].
In contrast to the approaches based on stable polynomials [1, 2], our algorithm relies on relaxing
the problem to a class of Fisher markets and then rounding an equilibrium allocation to an integral
assignment. Conceptually, this appears similar to the algorithm by Cole and Gkatzelis [18], but there
are many challenges that need to be overcome for non-separable valuations.
First, to guarantee a bounded approximation factor in the final rounding step, we introduce earning
limits into the resulting Fisher market. For additive valuations, this creates a market with a convex set
of equilibria. For budget-additive valuations, where we have earning and utility limits, we show that
the set of market equilibria can be non-convex. Hence, in contrast to the additive case, the toolbox for
solving convex programs (e.g., ellipsoid [17] or scaling algorithms [8, 18]) is not directly applicable for
computing an equilibrium. Instead, we design a new algorithm to compute an approximate equilibrium.
Based on a constant ε > 0, it perturbs the valuations and rounds the parameters vij up to the next
power of (1 + ε). Then it computes an exact equilibrium of the perturbed market in polynomial time,
which represents an approximate equilibrium in the original market. This yields a novel FPTAS for
markets with earning and utility limits, which might be of independent interest.
To compute an exact equilibrium in the perturbed market, we first obtain an equilibrium (prices p,
allocation x) of a market that results from ignoring all utility caps [9, 17]. This is not an equilibrium
of the market with both caps, because some buyers may be overspending. Let the surplus of a buyer
be the money spent minus the money needed to earn the optimal utility, and similarly let the surplus
of a good be the target earning minus the actual earning. Let S be the set of buyers who have positive
2
surplus at prices p. Our idea is to pick a buyer, say k, in S and decrease the prices of goods in a
coordinated fashion. The goal is to make k’s surplus zero while maintaining the surpluses of all goods
and all buyers not in S to be zero. We show that after a polynomial number of iterations of price
decrease, either the surplus of buyer k becomes zero or we discover a good with price 0 in equilibrium.
Picking a particular buyer is crucial in the analysis, because we rely on this buyer to show that a
certain parameter strictly decreases. This implies substantial price decrease of goods and polynomial
running time.
Given such an exact equilibrium wrt. perturbed valuations, we provide a new rounding algorithm
that turns the fractional equilibrium allocation into an integral one. While the algorithm exploits a
tree structure of the equilibrium allocation as in [18], the rounding must be much more careful to
correctly treat agents that reach their utility caps in the equilibrium. In particular, we first conduct
several initial assignment steps to arrive at a solution where we have a set of rooted trees on agents and
items, and each item j has exactly one child agent i who gets at least half of its fractional valuation
from j. In the main step of the rounding algorithm, we need to ensure that the root agent r receives
one of its child items. Here we pick a child item j that generates the most value for r. A problem arises
at the child agent i of j, since r receiving j could decrease i’s valuation by a lot more than a factor of
2. Recursively, we again need to enforce an allocation for the root agent, thereby “stealing” fractional
value from one of its grandchildren agents. This approach may seem hopeless to yield any reasonable
approximation guarantee, but we show that overall the agents only suffer by a small constant factor.
Our analysis of this rounding procedure provides a new lower bound on the Nash social welfare
obtained by the algorithm, which is complemented with a novel upper bound on the optimum solution.
Both bounds crucially exploit the properties of agents (goods) that reach the utility (earning) caps in
the market equilibrium. These bounds imply an approximation factor of 2e1/(2e) < 2.404. Since the
equilibrium conditions apply wrt. perturbed valuations, we obtain a (2e1/(2e) + ε)-approximation in
polynomial time, for any constant ε > 0.
Related Work The Nash social welfare is a classic objective for allocation of goods to agents. It
was proposed by Nash [37] for the bargaining problem as the unique objective that satisfies a collection
of natural axioms. Since then it has received significant attention in the literature on social choice and
fair division (see, e.g. [13, 19,28,40] for a subset of notable recent work, and the references therein).
For indivisible items and general non-negative valuations, the problem of maximizing the Nash
social welfare is hard to approximate within any finite factor [38]. For additive valuations, the problem
is APX-hard [32], and efficient 2-approximation algorithms based on market equilibrium [17, 18] and
stable polynomials [1,2] exist. These algorithms have been extended to give a 2-approximation also in
markets with multiple copies per item [9] and separable concave valuations [2].
For divisible items, the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare is solved by competitive
equilibria with equal incomes (CEEI) [36]. These equilibria often can be computed by solving convex
programs due to Eisenberg and Gale [25] or Shmyrev [42]. For additive valuations, there are combina-
torial [21] and even strongly polynomial-time algorithms [39,45] for computing such an equilibrium.
Unfortunately, even for additive valuations CEEI can be exponentially more valuable than optimal
solutions for indivisible items. To obtain an improved bound on the indivisible optimum, Cole and
Gkatzelis [18] introduced and rounded spending-restricted equilibria with earning caps for every good.
More generally, equilibria in markets with earning limits are described by a convex program [17]. They
can be computed and rounded efficiently to obtain a 2-approximation for additive valuations and any
number of indivisible items [9].
Budget-additive valuations are a popular class of submodular valuation functions, especially due to
applications in online advertising [33]. They are additive valuations with a global limit, which makes
the valuation non-separable. These utility limits have been recently proposed and studied in Fisher
markets, and the equilibria are described by a convex program [8,17]. An equilibrium in these markets
can be computed using algorithms for concave generalized flows [44], the set of equilibria forms a
lattice, and equilibria with maximum or minimum prices can also be obtained efficiently [8].
3
2 Preliminaries
Nash Social Welfare There is a set B of n agents and a set G of m indivisible items, where we
assume m ≥ n. We allocate the items to the agents, and we represent an allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn)
using a characteristic vector xS with xSij = 1 iff j ∈ Si and 0 otherwise. Agent i ∈ B has a value vij ≥ 0
for item j and a global utility cap ci > 0. The budget-additive valuation of agent i for an allocation
S of items is vi(x
S








. The goal is to find an allocation that approximates the










Our approximation algorithm in Section 3 relies on rounding an approximate equilibrium for a linear
Fisher market with earning and utility limits.
Fisher Markets with Earning and Utility Limits In such a market there is a set B of n buyers
and a set G of m divisible goods. Each good is owned by a separate seller and comes in unit supply.
Each buyer i ∈ B has a value uij ≥ 0 for a unit of good j ∈ G and an endowment mi ≥ 0 of money.







, where ci > 0 is the utility cap.
The vector x = (xi)i∈B with
∑
i∈B xij = 1 for every j ∈ G denotes a (fractional) allocation of goods
to buyers. For an allocation, we call i a capped buyer if ui(xi) = ci. We also maintain a vector p =
(p1, . . . , pm) of prices for the goods. Given such prices p, a demand bundle x
∗
i of buyer i is a bundle of




j pjxij ≤ mi
}
.
For price vector p and buyer i, we use λi = minj pj/uij and denote by αi = 1/λi the maximum bang-
per-buck (MBB) ratio (where we assume 0/0 = 0). Given prices p and allocation x, the money flow
fij from buyer i to seller j is given by fij = pjxij. If price pj > 0, then xij uniquely determines fij
and vice versa.
For the sellers, let xj =
∑
i xij, then the seller utility is uj(xj , pj) = min(dj , pjxj) = min (dj ,
∑
i fij),
where dj > 0 is the earning or income cap. We call seller j a capped seller if uj(xj , pj) = dj . An
optimal supply e∗j allows seller j to obtain the highest utility, i.e., e
∗
j ∈ argmax {uj(ej , pj) | ej ≤ 1}.
We consider three natural properties for allocation and supply vectors:
1. An allocation xi for buyer i is called modest if
∑
j uijxij ≤ ci. By definition, for uncapped buyers




2. A demand bundle xi is called thrifty or MBB if it consists only of MBB goods: xij > 0 only if
uij/pj = αi. For uncapped buyers every demand bundle is MBB.
3. A supply ej for seller j is called modest if ej = min(1, dj/pj).
Given a set of prices, a thrifty and modest demand bundle for buyer i minimizes the amount of
money required to obtain optimal utility. A modest supply for seller j minimizes the amount of supply
required to obtain optimal utility in equilibrium. Our interest lies in market equilibria that have thrifty
and modest demands and modest supply. Note that they also emerge when earning and utility caps are
not satiation points but limits in the form of hard constraints on the utility in equilibrium (c.f. [17]).
Definition 2.1 (Thrifty and Modest Equilibrium). A thrifty and modest (market) equilibrium is a
pair (x,p), where x is an allocation and p a vector of prices such that the following conditions hold:
(1) p ≥ 0 (prices are nonnegative), (2) ej is a modest supply for every j ∈ G, (3) xj ≤ ej for every
j ∈ G (no overallocation), (4) xi is a thrifty and modest demand bundle for every i ∈ B, and (5)
Walras’ law holds: pj(ej − xj) = 0 for every j ∈ G.
Note that in equilibrium, if xj < ej , then pj = 0. Moreover, we assume that all parameters
of the market uij , ci, dj and mi for all i ∈ B and j ∈ G are non-negative integers. Let U =
maxi∈B,j∈G{uij ,mi, ci, dj} be the largest integer in the representation of the market.
Consider the following condition termed money clearing : For each subset of buyers and the goods
these buyers are interested in, there must be a feasible allocation of the buyer money that does not
violate the earning caps. More formally, let Bˆ ⊆ B be a set of buyers, and N(Bˆ) = {j ∈ G | uij >
0 for some i ∈ Bˆ} be the set of goods such that there is at least one buyer in Bˆ with positive utility
for the good.








When there are only earning limits, money clearing is a precise characterization of markets that
have thrifty and modest equilibria [9]. For markets with both limits, it is sufficient for existence (see
Section 4.1).
Perturbed Markets Our FPTAS in Section 4.2 computes a thrifty and modest equilibrium in a
perturbed market M˜.
Definition 2.3 (Perturbed Utility, Perturbed Market). For a market M and a parameter ε > 0, the
perturbed utility of buyer i is given by u˜i(xi) =
∑
j u˜ijxij , where u˜ij = (1+ε)
kij for an integer kij > 0,
such that
u˜ij/(1 + ε) < uij ≤ u˜ij , ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G. (2)
The perturbed market M˜ is exactly the market M where every buyer i ∈ B has perturbed utilities u˜i.
In Section 4.2 we observe that an exact equilibrium in M˜ represents an ε-approximate equilibrium
for the unperturbed marketM. Moreover, given an exact equilibrium of M˜, rounding this equilibrium
to an integral assignment deteriorates the approximation factor of our algorithm for the Nash social
welfare only by a small constant (see Section 3.3).
3 Approximating the Nash Social Welfare
In this section, we present a (2e1/(2e) + ε)-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing the
Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations, for every constant ε > 0.
If vij ≥ ci, we can equivalently assume that vij = ci since the valuation can be at most ci.














. The following lemma is
straightforward and its proof is omitted.
Lemma 3.1. For every integral allocation x we have v′i(x) = vi(x).
Henceforth, we will assume that vij ≤ ci, for all i ∈ B, j ∈ G. We relate our problem to a Fisher
market M with earning and utility limits in a direct way – in M, we have a buyer i for each agent i
and a divisible good j for each item j. For each buyer i the budget mi = 1, uij = vij , and ci is the
utility cap. Further, we assume that each good j comes in unit supply, and its earning cap is dj = 1.
Lemma 3.2. If the market M is not money clearing, then the maximum Nash social welfare for
indivisible items is 0.
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Proof. Obviously, if marketM is not money clearing, then there exists a subset B′ of buyers such that
the sum of earning caps of goods in Γ(B′) = {j | vij > 0, i ∈ B
′} is less than the sum of budgets of
buyers in B′. This implies that |Γ(B′)| < |B′|. Hence, there is no allocation where each agent in B′
gets at least one item of positive valuation. Thus, the Nash social welfare must always be 0.
When the market is not money clearing, every allocation has the optimal Nash social welfare. It
is easy to check condition (1) by a max-flow computation. We therefore assume that our instance
satisfies it. We show in Section 4.1 that a money-clearing market M always has a thrifty and modest
equilibrium.
Suppose we are given such an equilibrium (x,p). Our subsequent analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2
shows how to obtain a 2e1/(2e)-approximation for the Nash social welfare based on any such equilibrium.
In Section 3.3 we provide a guarantee for rounding an equilibrium of the perturbed market, which can
be computed in polynomial time (see Section 4.2).
The Nash social welfare objective allows scaling the valuation function of every agent i by any
factor γi > 0. This does neither change the optimum solution nor the approximation factor. Our first
aim is to normalize the valuation function for agent i based on the MBB ratio αi of buyer i in the
market equilibrium (x,p).
In equilibrium, there can be a set of goods G0 = {j | pj = 0}. All buyers B0 = {i | j ∈ G0, uij > 0}
interested in any good j ∈ G0 have infinite MBB ratio. Due to our equilibrium conditions, every i ∈ B0
must be capped and receive allocation only from G0, i.e., ui(x) = ci and xij > 0 only if j ∈ G0 and
uij > 0. Moreover, since no buyer i ∈ B \B0 has positive utility for any of the goods G0, these goods
are allocated only to B0. Therefore, we can treat items G0 and agents B0 separately in the analysis.
For all i ∈ B \ B0, we normalize v
′
ij = vij/αi and c
′
i = ci/αi. This does not change the demand
bundle for buyer i, and thus (x,p) remains an equilibrium. In the resulting instance, every such buyer
has MBB of 1 in (x,p). Consequently, v′ij ≤ pj for all i ∈ B \ B0, j ∈ G, where equality holds if and
only if j is an MBB good of buyer i. For simplicity we assume that v and c fulfill these conditions
directly, i.e., vij = v
′
ij and ci = c
′
i. Together with the fact that vij ≤ ci,∀(i, j) this implies
vij ≤ min(pj , ci), for all i ∈ B \B0, j ∈ G . (3)
Moreover, the following lemma is a helpful insight on the structure of equilibria.
Lemma 3.3. Consider a capped buyer i. Let j be an MBB good of buyer i. Then pj ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose i is a capped buyer with MBB good j and pj > 1. Then our scaling implies that the
MBB ratio is 1, and thus 1 = vij/pj < vij ≤ ci. Since the budget of i is 1, its maximum utility is
1 < ci, which is a contradiction.
3.1 Upper Bound
In this section, we obtain an upper bound on the optimal Nash social welfare when valuations are
normalized based on an equilibrium (x,p). The bound relates to prices and utility caps of the capped
buyers in (x,p). We denote by Bc and Bu the set of capped and uncapped buyers in (x,p), respectively.
Recall that since (x,p) is a thrifty and modest equilibrium, buyers may not spend their entire budget
and sellers may not sell their entire supply. We denote by mai = min(mi, ci/αi) the active budget of
buyer i where αi is the MBB ratio of buyer i at prices p, and by p
a
j = min(pj , dj) the active price of
good j. The following result is a generalization of a similar bound shown in [18]. The main difference
is to carefully account for the contribution of capped buyers.



















where x∗ is an integral allocation that maximizes the Nash social welfare.






ci. For the rest of the proof, we consider the remaining agents B \ B0. Due to
our scaling to MBB of 1, every capped i ∈ Bc \B0 has ci = vi(x) = m
a
i ≤ 1, whereas every uncapped
i ∈ Bu has ci > vi(x) = m
a









































∗), we can assume for the rest of this proof that all inequalities (3) are tight, i.e.,






j∈G pj . We denote by Gc be the set
of goods allocated to agents in Bc \B0 in x










































Let G1u = {j ∈ G | pj > 1;x
∗
ij = 1, i ∈ Bu} be the set of items with price more than 1 that are assigned
in x∗ to buyers in Bu. Let B
1
u = {i ∈ Bu | x
∗
ij = 1, j ∈ G
1
u} be the set of buyers from Bu that receive
an item of G1u in x
∗. Note that |B1u| ≤ |G
1








































∗), we now take a fractional improvement step and




and fractionally allocate them to buyers in B \ (B1u ∪ B0). Moreover, we take the goods assigned to
B \ (B1u ∪ B0) and redistribute them fractionally among these buyers. However, we require that the
fractional solution respects the upper bound (5). We denote by x˜ the best solution obtained in this
improvement step. Note that the Nash social welfare can only increase.
Recall that ci ≤ 1 for every capped buyer i ∈ Bc \ B0, so vi(x˜) ≤ ci ≤ 1. Further, since no good






x˜ satisfies (5), so we obtain
∑
i∈Bu\B1u












vi(x˜), we assume that each buyer in Bu \B
1













, ∀i ∈ Bu \B
1
u . (7)
Further, recall that each buyer in i ∈ B1u gets at least one good j with price pj > 1 in x
∗. Since
vij = min(ci, pj) > 1, we have vi(x
∗) > 1 for all i ∈ B1u.
Next we observe that the maximum value for
∏
i∈B\B0
vi(x˜) is obtained when each buyer i ∈ Bc\B0
gets value ci, each buyer i ∈ B
1






u|, and each buyer i ∈ Bu\B
1
u
gets value 1. This will prove the claim.
Suppose at x˜, some (hence, by assumption, each) buyer in Bu \ B
1
u receives value more than 1,
then (7) implies that at least one buyer i ∈ Bc \ B0 gets value strictly less than ci < 1. Since x˜ is
allowed to be fractional for buyers in Bc \ B0 and Bu \ B
1
u, we can reallocate some amount of good
from a i′ ∈ Bu \B
1
u to i. This increases the Nash social welfare, which is a contradiction.
Further suppose at x˜ we have |B1u| < |G
1
u|, i.e., a buyer i
′ ∈ B1u gets at least two goods of G
1
u. Then
(7) implies that either buyers in Bu \B
1
u get value strictly less than 1 or there is a buyer i ∈ Bc \B0
who gets value strictly less than ci, or both. In all cases, we can increase the Nash social welfare
by taking one entire good of G1u from i
′, reallocate it (fractionally) to buyers in Bu \ B
1
u, and then
reallocate some amount of goods from buyers in Bu \B
1
u to buyer i ∈ Bc \B0 with value less than ci
(if any). This increases the Nash social welfare, which is a contradiction.
3.2 Rounding Equilibria
In this section, we give an algorithm to round a fractional allocation of a thrifty and modest equilibrium
(x,p) to an integral one. W.l.o.g., we may assume that the allocation graph (B ∪ G,E) with E =
{{i, j} ∈ B ×G | xij > 0} is a forest [24,39]. In the following, we only discuss how to round the trees
in (B \ B0) × (G \ G0). For trees in B0 × G0, the rounding and the analysis are very similar, but
independent of prices and slightly simpler (see Appendix A). Consider the following procedure:
Preprocessing: For each tree component of the allocation graph, assign some agent to be a root
node. For each good that has no child-agent, assign it to its parent agent. For each good j, if
it has two or more child agents, then keep only one child agent who buys the largest amount of
j. For every other child agent i, delete the edge (i, j) and make i the root node of the newly
created tree. For each good j, if its price is at most half of the active budget of its child-agent
i, i.e., pj ≤ m
a
i /2, then assign j to its parent agent and make the child agent i the root node of
a newly created tree.
Rounding: For each tree component, do the following recursively: Assign the root agent a child-good
j that gives him the maximum value (among all children goods) in the fractional solution. Except
in the subtree rooted at j, assign each good to its child-agent in the remaining tree. Make the
child-agent of good j the root node of the newly created tree.
Lemma 3.4. After preprocessing, each tree component T has kT + 1 agents and kT goods, for some
kT > 1. The valuation of the root agent r is at least vr(x)/2. For all other agents i the valuation is at
least vi(x).
Proof. The first part is straightforward since after preprocessing, every remaining good has exactly
one parent agent and one child agent. For the second part, whenever an agent loses allocation, a new
tree component is being created, and we make this agent its root node. Since vij ≤ ci,∀(i, j), each
capped agent needs to buy in total at least one unit of goods and each uncapped agent spends his entire
budget. If a child agent i is cut off from a good j, then either xij ≤ 1/2 or pj ≤ m
a
i /2. In the latter
case, the maximum utility of good j for agent i is at most half of its active budget. In the former case,
if i is capped, xijvij ≤ 1/2·ci ≤ ci/2 = vi(x)/2, and if i is uncapped, xijpj ≤ p
a
j/2 ≤ 1/2 = vi(x)/2.
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Lemma 3.5. After rounding, each agent i that is assigned its parent good obtains a valuation of at
least vi(x)/2.
Proof. Consider any good j in the tree in the rounding step. Since j was not assigned to its parent
agent during preprocessing, we know its price is at least half of the active budget of its child agent.
Hence, from this good the child agent obtains a valuation of at least half of the valuation in the
equilibrium.
Consider a tree T at the beginning of the rounding step with kT + 1 agents and kT goods. Let
a1, g1, a2, g2, . . . , al, gl, al+1 be the recursion path in T starting from the root agent a1 and ending at
the leaf agent al+1 such that a1, . . . , al+1 became root agents of the trees formed recursively during
the rounding step, and good gi is assigned to ai in this process, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. We denote by ki the
number of children for agent ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.















Proof. First assume that all prices are at most 1, which implies that all goods are fully sold. Let
c¯i = min{1, ci},∀i ∈ B. Let qi = xai,gi be the amount of good gi bought by agent ai in the equilibrium,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Clearly,
∑l
j=1 kj ≤ k. Using Lemma 3.4 and the fact that the rounding assigns a child
good that gives the maximum value in the fractional solution to the root agent, the value obtained by
a1 in the rounded solution is at least
c¯1
2q1k1
; note that the child contributes at least c¯1/(2k1) to the utility
of the root and assigning the good completely will multiply this by 1/q1. Since vij ≤ min{ci, pj},∀(i, j)
and pj ≤ 1, we note that
c¯1
2q1k1
≤ c¯1, so this is indeed a feasible lower bound on the valuation achieved
by the root agent.
Due to the assignment of g1 to a1, a2 loses at most c¯2(1− q1) value, but he still gets at least c¯2q1
value from other goods. Hence, similarly, assigning g2 to a2 in the rounded solution, a2 gets value
at least c¯2q1q2k2 . Again, this represents a number less than c¯2 and hence a feasible lower bound on the
valuation of a2. Continuing in this way, we obtain that in the rounded solution, ai gets value at least
c¯iqi−1
qiki
for 2 ≤ i ≤ l, and al+1 gets value at least c¯l+1ql.
Using Lemma 3.5, each of the remaining k− l agents in T get a value at least vi(x)/2. This implies









Next we remove the assumption that all prices are at most 1. Consider a good j such that pj > 1.
Using Lemma 3.3, it can be only assigned to an uncapped agent i during the rounding. Further since
pj = vij ≤ ci, the value of agent i with this allocation is at least pj. Finally, since at most one good
is assigned to each agent during the rounding step, each capped good is assigned to a separate agent,












Theorem 3.2. The rounding procedure gives a 2e1/2e-approximation for the optimal Nash social wel-
fare with budget-additive valuations, where 2e1/2e < 2.404.
Proof. Suppose there are trees T 1, T 2, . . . , T a at the beginning of the rounding. Let ki + 1 and ki be
the number of agents and goods in tree T i, respectively. Let li + 1 be the number of agents on the
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path in T i traced during the rounding step, and let ki1, . . . , k
i
li
be the degrees of the number of children
goods for agents along that path.
The bound in Lemma 3.6 for trees T ⊆ (B \B0)× (G \G0) can also be obtained for our rounding
of trees T ⊆ B0 × G0 (Lemma A.3 in the Appendix). Thus, the Nash social welfare of the rounded
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where the first inequality follows from
∑
i(k


























j ≤ n and the fact that (2x)
x is minimum at x = 1/2e.
3.3 Rounding Equilibria of Perturbed Markets
Given a parameter ε′ > 0, our FPTAS in Section 4.2 computes an exact equilibrium for a perturbed







same caps ci and v˜ij ≥ vij ≥ v˜ij/(1 + ε
′). Suppose we apply our rounding algorithm to the exact





























Given a constant ε′′ > 0, we apply the FPTAS with ε′ = ε′′/n. This yields an approximation ratio of
at most 2e1/2eeε
′′
= 2e1/2e + ε, for some constant ε > 0. We summarize our main result:
Corollary 3.1. For every ε > 0 there is an algorithm with running time polynomial in n, m,
log maxi,j{vij , ci}, and 1/ε that computes an allocation which represents a (2e
1/2e + ε)-approximation
for the optimal Nash social welfare.
4 Computing Equilibria
4.1 Existence and Structure of Equilibria
Thrifty and modest equilibria in markets with utility and earning limits have interesting and non-
trivial structure. For markets with utility limits, such an equilibrium always exists [8]. For markets
with earning limits, such an equilibrium may not exist, because uncapped buyers always spend all their
money. In these markets, the money-clearing condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of
a thrifty and modest equilibrium [9] (see also [17] for the case that uij > 0 for all i ∈ B, j ∈ G).
We observe that in a market M with both limits, money clearing is sufficient but not necessary
for the existence of a thrifty and modest equilibrium. Our FPTAS below gives an ε-approximate
equilibrium in money-clearing markets, for arbitrarily small ε. Since market parameters are finite
integers, for sufficiently small ε this implies existence of an exact equilibrium.
This is interesting since the structure of equilibria in such markets can be quite complex. For
example, in money-clearing markets M there can be no convex program describing thrifty and modest
equilibria. This holds even if we restrict to the ones that are Pareto-optimal with respect to the set
of all thrifty and modest equilibria. Equilibria for the corresponding markets without caps, or with
either earning or utility caps might not remain equilibria in the market with both sets of caps. Hence,
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existence of a thrifty and modest equilibrium in money-clearing markets M follows neither from a
convex program nor by a direct application of existing algorithms for markets with only one set of
either utility or earning caps. The following proposition summarizes our observations.
Proposition 4.1. There are markets M with utility and earning limits such that the following holds:
1. M is not money-clearing and has a thrifty and modest equilibrium.
2. M is money-clearing, and the set of thrifty and modest equilibria is not convex. Among these
equilibria, there are multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria, and their set is also not convex.
3. For a money-clearing market M and the three related markets – (1) with only utility caps, (2)
with only earning caps, (3) without any caps – the sets of equilibria are mutually disjoint.
Proof. We provide an example market for each of the three properties.
Property 1: Consider a linear market with one buyer and one good. The buyer has m1 = 2, utility
u11 = 2, and utility cap c1 = 1. The good has earning cap d1 = 1. The unique thrifty and modest
equilibrium has price p1 = 2 and allocation x11 = 1/2. Both seller and buyer exactly reach their cap.
The active budget mai = 1 equals the earning cap. Conversely, due to price 2, the supply is 1, for
which the achieved utility equals the utility cap. Note that condition (1) is violated.
Property 2: Consider the following example. There are two buyers and two goods. The buyer
budgets are m1 = 1 and m2 = 10. The utility caps are c1 = ∞, c2 = 1, the earning caps are d1 = 5,
d2 = 6. The linear utilities are given by the parameters u11 = u22 = 1, u12 = 3, and u21 = 1/10.
If we ignore all caps, the unique equilibrium has prices (1, 10) and buyer utilities (1, 1). If we ignore
the utility caps and consider only earning caps, the equilibrium prices are (5y, 50y) and buyer utilities
are (1/5y, 1/5y), for y ≥ 1. If we ignore the earning caps and consider only utility caps, the equilibrium
prices are (1, x) and buyer utilities are (1, 1), for x ∈ [3, 10].
With all caps, the equilibria form two disjoint convex sets: either prices (1, x) and buyer utilities
(1, 1), for x ∈ [3, 6]; or prices (5y, 50y) and buyer utilities (1/5y, 1/5y), for y ≥ 1. Note that (1, x) for
x ∈ (6, 10] are not equilibrium prices, since this would violate the earning cap of seller 2.
Observe that there are exactly two Pareto-optimal equilibria: prices (1, 6) (which also represents
income for the sellers) and buyer utilities (1, 1); and prices (5, 50) (with income (3, 6) for the sellers)
and buyer utilities (1/5, 1/5). The first equilibrium is strictly better for both buyers, the second one
strictly better for seller 1.
Property 3: Consider the following market with 2 buyers and 2 goods. The buyer budgets are
m1 = 100 and m2 = 11. The utility caps are c1 = 0.9, c2 =∞. The earning caps are d1 = 9, d2 =∞.
The utilities are u11 = u22 = u12 = u21 = 1.
If we ignore all caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (55.5, 55.5). If we ignore the buyer caps and
consider only seller caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (102, 102). If we ignore the seller caps and
consider only buyer caps, the unique equilibrium prices are (10, 10). For both buyer and seller caps,
the unique equilibrium prices are (20, 20).
4.2 Computing Equilibria in Perturbed Markets
In this section, we analyze Algorithm 1 for computing an approximate equilibrium in money-clearing
markets M. Recall that the input is uij ,mi, ci, dj ,∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G, where uij is the utility derived by
buyer i for a unit amount of good j, mi is the budget of buyer i, ci is the utility cap of buyer i, and dj
is the earning cap of seller j. For any ε > 0, Algorithm 1 computes an exact equilibrium in a perturbed
market M˜, where we increase every non-zero parameter uij to the next-larger power of (1 + ε).
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Algorithm 1. FPTAS for M with Earning and Utility Caps
Input : Market M given by budgets mi, utility caps ci, earning caps dj , utilities
uij,∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G, approximation parameter ε;
Output: Equilibrium (x,p) of the perturbed market M˜
1 Construct M˜, set U˜ ← maxij u˜ij , and run the rest of the algorithm on this perturbed market
2 (f ,p)← equilibrium of M˜ when ignoring all utility caps
3 Z ← {i ∈ B | s(i) = 0} // set of zero surplus buyers
4 while Z 6= B do
5 k ← a buyer in B \ Z // s(k) > 0
6 while (s(k) > 0) and (minj∈G:pj>0 pj > 1/nU˜
n) do
7 Bˆ ← {k} ∪ {i ∈ B | i can reach k in the MBB residual graph}
8 Gˆ← {j ∈ G | j can reach k in the MBB residual graph}
9 p′ ← p
10 x← 1; Define pj ← xpj,∀j ∈ Gˆ // also active budgets & prices change
11 Decrease x continuously down from 1 until one of the following events occurs
12 Event 1: A new MBB edge appears
13 Event 2: x = MinFactor(p′, f , Bˆ, Gˆ, Z) // Algorithm 2
14 f ← FeasibleFlow(p, Z) // Algorithm 3
15 if minj:pj>0 pj ≤ 1/nU˜
n then
16 Choose any good ℓ ∈ argmin{pj | pj > 0}
17 Gˆ← {ℓ} ∪ {j ∈ G | j is connected to ℓ in the MBB graph }
18 Bˆ ← {i ∈ B | u˜ij > 0, j ∈ Gˆ}
19 Assign (xi)i∈Bˆ according to f
20 s(i)← 0,∀i ∈ Bˆ and pj ← 0,∀j ∈ Gˆ
21 Z ← Z ∪ {i ∈ B | s(i) = 0}
22 Assign xi according to f for all buyers i ∈ B that have not been assigned yet.
23 return (x,p)
Additional Concepts Our algorithm steers prices and flow towards equilibrium by monitoring the
surplus of buyers and sellers. Note that a buyer i is capped if miαi ≥ ci.
Definition 4.1 (Active Budget, Active Price, Surplus). Given prices p and money flow f , the active
budget of buyer i is mai = min(mi, ci/αi), the active supply of seller j is e
a
j = min(1, dj/pj), and
the active price is paj = pje
a




i , and the
surplus of good j is s(j) = paj −
∑
i∈B fij.
Several graphs connected to the MBB ratio are useful here. As argued in [24, 39], we can assume
w.l.o.g. that the MBB graph is non-degenerate, i.e., it is a forest.
Definition 4.2 (MBB edge, MBB graph, MBB residual graph). Given prices p, an undirected pair
{i, j} is an MBB edge if i ∈ B, j ∈ G, and uij/pj = αi. The MBB graph G(p) = (B ∪ G,E) is an
undirected graph that contains exactly the MBB edges. Given prices p and money flow f , the MBB
residual graph Gr(f ,p) = (B ∪G,A) is a directed graph with the following arcs: If {i, j} is MBB, then
(i, j) is an arc in A; if {i, j} is MBB and fij > 0, then (j, i) is an arc in A.
Let us also define a reverse flow network N−(p, Z) by adding a sink t to the the MBB graph. The
network has nodes G∪B∪{t}, edges (i, t) for i ∈ B \Z, and the reverse MBB edges (j, i) if (i, j) is an
MBB edge. All edges have infinite capacity. The supply at node j ∈ G is paj , demand at node i ∈ B is








i . The flow in the network corresponds to money. Given
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Algorithm 2. MinFactor
Input : Prices p, flow f , set of buyers Bˆ, set of goods Gˆ, set of zero-surplus buyers Z
Output: Minimum price decrease consistent with the input configuration
1 E ← Set of MBB edges at prices p between Bˆ and Gˆ
2 Gc ← Set of goods from Gˆ that are capped at (f ,p)
3 Bc ← Set of buyers from Bˆ that are capped at (f ,p)
4 λi ← mink∈G pk/uik,∀i ∈ Bˆ
5 Set up the following LP in flow variables g and x:
minx∑
i∈Bˆ gij = dj , ∀j ∈ Gc∑
i∈Bˆ gij = xpj, ∀j ∈ Gˆ \Gc∑
j∈Gˆ gij = xciλi, ∀i ∈ Bc ∩ Z∑
j∈Gˆ gij ≥ xciλi, ∀i ∈ Bc \ Z∑
j∈Gˆ gij = mi, ∀i ∈ (Bˆ \Bc) ∩ Z∑
j∈Gˆ gij ≥ mi, ∀i ∈ (Bˆ \Bc) \ Z
gij = 0, ∀(i, j) 6∈ E
gij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Bˆ, j ∈ Gˆ
6 return Optimal solution x of above LP






i = fit .
Buyers in Z do not have edges to the sink. Hence, their surplus is fixed to 0 at every feasible flow.
Algorithm and Analysis Algorithm 1 computes an exact equilibrium of M˜. For convenience, it
maintains a money flow f . For goods with non-zero price, f is equivalent to an allocation x. When the
algorithm encounters a set of goods with price 0, the buyers interested in these goods must be capped,
and the algorithm determines a suitable allocation for them by solving a system of linear equations.
The algorithm first calls a subroutine to compute a market equilibrium ignoring the utility caps
of the buyers. Such an equilibrium exists because the market is money-clearing, can be computed in
polynomial time [9, 17], and consists of a pair (f ,p) of flow and prices such that the outflow of every
good j is paj and the inflow of every buyer i is mi. Given this equilibrium, the algorithm then initializes
Z to the set of buyers with surplus is zero in (f ,p).
The following Invariants are maintained during the run of Algorithm 1:
• no price ever increases.
• if s(i) = 0 for a buyer i, it remains 0. Z is monotonically increasing.
• N−(p, Z) allows a feasible flow, i.e., s(i) ≥ 0 for every buyer i ∈ B and s(j) = 0 for every good
j ∈ G.
More formally, the algorithm uses a descending-price approach. There is always a flow in N−(p, Z)
with outflow of a good j ∈ G equal to paj , in-flow into buyer i ∈ B ∩ Z equal to m
a
i , and in-flow
into buyer i ∈ B \ Z at least mai . Descending prices imply that if a good (buyer) becomes uncapped
(capped), it remains uncapped (capped).
The algorithm ends when Z = B, i.e., all buyers have surplus zero, and hence (f ,p) is an equilibrium
of M˜. In the body of the outer while-loop, we first pick a buyer k whose surplus is positive. The
inner while loop ends when either the surplus of k becomes zero or the minimum positive price of a
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Algorithm 3. FeasibleFlow
Input : Perturbed market M˜, prices p, and set of zero-surplus buyers Z
Output: Feasible flow consistent with the input configuration
1 E ← Set of MBB edges at prices p
2 λi ← mink∈G pk/uik,∀i ∈ B
3 Bc ← Set of capped buyers at p
4 Gc ← Set of capped goods at p
5 Set up the following feasibility LP in flow variables f :∑
i∈Bˆ fij = dj , ∀j ∈ Gc∑
i∈Bˆ fij = pj , ∀j ∈ G \Gc∑
j∈Gˆ fij = ciλi, ∀i ∈ Bc ∩ Z∑
j∈Gˆ fij ≥ ciλi, ∀i ∈ Bc \ Z∑
j∈Gˆ fij = mi, ∀i ∈ (B \Bc) ∩ Z∑
j∈Gˆ fij ≥ mi, ∀i ∈ (B \Bc) \ Z
fij = 0, ∀(i, j) 6∈ E
fij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ G
6 return Optimal solution f of above LP
good, say ℓ, is at most 1/nU˜n, where U˜ is the maximum parameter value of the perturbed utilities.
In the former case, the size of Z increases (in line 21). In the latter case, we obtain a set Gˆ of goods
connected to ℓ through MBB edges and a set Bˆ of buyers who have non-zero utility for some good
in Gˆ. Since the price of each good in Gˆ is so low and their surplus is zero, each buyer in Bˆ must be
capped. Hence we fix the allocation of buyers in Bˆ according to the current money flow f , and set the
prices of all goods in Gˆ and surplus of all buyers in Bˆ to zero. Since the algorithm maintains goods
with price 0 and buyers with surplus 0, the inner-while loop is executed at most m+ n times.
In the body of inner while-loop, we construct the set Bˆ of buyers and Gˆ of goods that can reach
buyer k in the MBB residual graph (see Definition 4.2). We then continuously decrease the prices of
all goods in Gˆ by a common factor x, starting from x = 1. This may destroy MBB edges connecting
buyers in Bˆ with goods in G \ Gˆ. However, by definition of Gˆ there is no flow on such edges. For
uncapped goods in Gˆ (capped buyers in Bˆ), this decreases the active price (budget) by a factor of x.
We stop if one of the two events happens: (1) a new MBB edge appears, and (2) x is equal to the
minimum factor possible that allows a feasible flow with the current MBB edges, i.e., in-flow into a
good j ∈ Gˆ is equal to paj , out-flow of a buyer in Bˆ ∩ Z is equal to m
a
i , and out-flow of a buyer in
Bˆ \ Z is at least mai . While the value of x for event (1) results from ratios of u˜ij, the value of x for
event (2) is found by Algorithm 2 based on a linear program (LP). Observe that the flow f and x = 1
are a feasible initial solution for the LP.
After the event happened, we update to a new feasible flow f using Algorithm 3. For prices p and
the set Z of zero-surplus buyers, the in-flow into a good j ∈ G must be equal to paj , out-flow of a buyer
in Z must be equal to mai , and out-flow of a buyer in B \ Z must be at least m
a
i . Algorithm 3 sets
up a feasibility LP to find such a feasible flow. Observe that this feasibility set is non-empty due to
Event 2.
The following lemma is straightforward, we omit the proof.
Lemma 4.1. The Invariants hold during the run of Algorithm 1.
Next we bound the running time of Algorithm 1. Event 1 provides a new MBB edge between a
buyer in B \ Bˆ and a good in Gˆ. Event 2 restricts the price decrease in x such that the Invariants are









j , where Γ(S) is the set of goods to which buyers in S have MBB edges,
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and (2) further decrease of prices would make the total active budget of buyers in S more than the
total active prices of Γ(S). This condition would violate the invariant that N−(p, Z) has a feasible
flow where the surplus of each good is zero.
If the subset S is equal to Bˆ or S contains buyer k, then the surplus of k in every feasible flow is
zero at such a minimum x, and hence the inner-while loop ends. Otherwise, the MBB edges between
buyers in B \S and goods in Γ(S) will become non-MBB in the next iteration. So in each event of the
inner-while loop, either a new MBB edge evolves or an existing MBB edge vanishes. Next, we show
that for a given buyer k, the total number of iterations of the inner-while loop is polynomially bounded.
For this, we first show that price of a good strictly decreases during each iteration of inner-while loop.
Lemma 4.2. In each iteration of inner-while loop, the MBB ratio of buyer k strictly increases.
Proof. Each iteration of the inner while-loop ends with one of the two events. Clearly, Event 1 can
occur only when the prices of goods in Gˆ strictly decrease, and this implies that the MBB of buyer k







j , where Γ(S) is the set of goods to which S have MBB edges.








j at the beginning
of this iteration, and since equality emerges, prices must have strictly decreased and the MBB of k
strictly increased.
If k 6∈ S, then S 6= Bˆ and flow on all MBB edges from Bˆ \ S to Γ(S) has become zero. Note that
there is at least one such edge due to the construction of Bˆ and Gˆ. Using the fact that there was a








j at the beginning of this iteration, we conclude
that prices of goods must have strictly decreased and the MBB of k strictly increased.
Next we show that the price of a good substantially decreases after a certain number of iterations.
For this, we partition the iterations into phases, where every phase has n2 iterations of the inner
while-loop.
Lemma 4.3. Let p and p′ be the prices at the beginning and end of a phase, respectively. Then
p′j ≤ pj,∀j ∈ G, and there exists a good ℓ such that p
′
ℓ ≤ pℓ/(1 + ε).
Proof. Due to Lemma 4.1, we have p′j ≤ pj,∀j ∈ G. For the second part, note that Bˆ always contains
buyer k during an entire run of inner while-loop. Since prices monotonically decrease, the MBB αk of
buyer k monotonically increases. Further, if there is a MBB path from buyer k to a good j, then we








b) and an integer c
αkpj =
∏









= (1 + ε)c .
In each iteration, either a new MBB edge evolves or an existing MBB edge vanishes. When a new
MBB edge evolves, a new MBB path from buyer k to a good j gets established. When an existing
MBB edge vanishes, then an old MBB path from k to a good j gets destroyed. Further, if there is an
MBB path from a good j to buyer k, then price of good j monotonically decreases. If there is no MBB
path from a good j to buyer k, then price of good j does not decrease. After n2 events, there has to
be a good j such that initially there is an MBB path from k to j, then no MBB path between them
for some iterations, then again an MBB path between them. Let pj be the price of good j at the time
when there is no path between k and j, and let αk and α
′
k be the MBB for buyer k at the time the
MBB path between j and k was broken and when it was later again established, respectively. Since
pj does not change unless there is a path between k and j, we have
αkpj = (1 + ε)
c1 and α′kpj = (1 + ε)
c2 , for some integers c1 and c2.
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Since α′k > αk due to Lemma 4.2, we have α
′
k ≥ αk(1+ ε). Let good l give the MBB to buyer k at α
′
k,
and let pl and p
′
l be the prices of good l when the MBB path between j and k was broken and when





k ≥ αk(1 + ε) ≥ (1 + ε)uil/pl,
and p′l ≤ pl/(1 + ε).




Proof. From Lemma 4.3, in each phase the price of a good decreases by a factor of (1 + ε). The
number of iterations in a phase is O(n2). The starting price is at most
∑
imi. If a price be-
comes at most 1/nU˜n, the inner while-loop ends for a particular buyer k. Hence, the number of
phases is at most n log1+ε nU˜
n
∑





Theorem 4.1. For every ε > 0, Algorithm 1 computes a thrifty and modest equilibrium in the perturbed
market M˜ in time polynomial in n, U and 1/ε.
Proof. From Lemma 4.1, all invariants are maintained throughout the algorithm. Hence, the surplus
of each good is 0, the surplus of each buyer is non-negative, and prices decrease monotonically. The
algorithm ends when surplus of all buyers is zero. During the algorithm, when the price of a good,
say ℓ, becomes at most 1/nU˜n, where U˜ is the largest perturbed utility parameter, then the price of
all the goods connected to ℓ by MBB edges is at most 1/n. Since the minimum budget of a buyer is
at least 1, all buyers buying these goods have to be capped. That implies that there is an equilibrium
where prices of these goods are zero.
Lemma 4.4 shows that there are at most O(n3 log1+ε nU˜
n
∑
imi) iterations, which can be upper
bounded by O(n4/ε log(nU)). Each iteration can be implemented in polynomial time.
Approximate Equilibrium Our algorithm computes an exact equilibrium in M˜ in polynomial
time. We show that such an exact equilibrium of M˜ represents an ε-approximate equilibrium of
M, thereby obtaining an FPTAS for the problem. Based on ε, let us define the precise notion of
ε-approximate market equilibrium, which is based on a notion of ε-approximate demand bundle.
Definition 4.3 (Approximate Demand). For a vector p of prices, consider a demand bundle x∗i for
buyer i. An allocation xi for buyer i is called an ε-approximate (thrifty and modest) demand bundle
if (1)
∑
j uijxij ≤ ci, (2)
∑
j xijpj ≤ m
a
i , and (3) ui(xi) ≥ (1− ε)ui(x
∗
i ).
An ε-approximate (thrifty and modest) equilibrium differs from an exact equilibrium only by a
relaxation of condition (4) to ε-approximate demand (c.f. Definition 2.1)
Definition 4.4 (Approximate Equilibrium). An ε-approximate (thrifty and modest) equilibrium is a
pair (x,p), where x is an allocation and p a vector of prices such that conditions (1)-(3), (5) from
Definition 2.1 hold, and (4) xi is an ε-approximate demand bundle for every i ∈ B.
Note that our definition is rather demanding, since there are many further relaxations (e.g., we
require exact market clearing, modest supplies, exact earning and utility caps, etc), some of which are
found in other notions of approximate equilibrium in the literature.
Lemma 4.5. An exact equilibrium (x,p) of M˜ is an ε-approximate equilibrium of M.
Proof. Let αi and α˜i be the MBB of buyer i at prices p w.r.t. utility ui and perturbed utility u˜i,





the maximum utility buyer i can obtain in M and M˜, respectively. Clearly u∗i = min{ci,miαi}, and
u˜∗i = min{ci,miα˜i}.
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Since (x,p) is an exact equilibrium of M˜, the MBB condition implies that xij > 0 only if u˜ij/pj =




i /(1+ε) ≥ u
∗
i (1−
ε). Further, since u˜ij ≥ uij, we have
∑
j xijpj = m
a
i ,∀i. In addition, since (x,p) is an exact equilibrium
for M˜, we obtain
∑
i xij = min{1, p
a
j/pj},∀{j ∈ G | pj > 0} and
∑
i xij ≤ 1,∀{j ∈ G | pj = 0}. This
proves the claim.
Corollary 4.1. Algorithm 1 is an FPTAS for computing an ε-approximate equilibrium for money-
clearing markets with earning and utility limits.
5 Hardness of Approximation
In this section, we provide a result on the hardness of approximation of the maximum Nash social
welfare with budget-additive valuations. The best previous bound was a factor of 1.00008 for the special
case of additive valuations [32]. Our improved lower bound of
√
8/7 > 1.069 follows by adapting a
construction in [15] for (sum) social welfare,
Theorem 5.1. There is no
√
8/7-approximation algorithm for Nash social welfare with budget-additive
valuations unless P=NP.
Proof. Chakrabarty and Goel [15] show hardness for (sum) social welfare by reducing from MAX-E3-
LIN-2. An instance of this problem consists of n variables and m linear equations over GF(2). Each
equation consists of 3 distinct variables. For the Nash social welfare objective, we require slightly more
control over the behavior of the optimal assignments. Therefore, we consider the stronger problem
variant Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2, in which each variable occurs exactly k times in the equations.
Theorem 5.2 ( [16]). For every constant ε ∈ (0, 14) there is a constant k(ε) and a class of instances of
Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2 with k ≥ k(ε), for which we cannot decide if the optimal variable assignment
fulfills more than (1− ε)m equations or less than (1/2 + ε)m equations, unless P=NP.
Our reduction follows the construction in [15]. We only sketch the main properties here. For more
details see [15, Section 4].
For each variable xi we introduce two agents 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉. Each of these agents has a cap of
ci = 4k, where k is the number of occurrences of xi in the equations. Since in E3-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2
every variable occurs exactly k times, we have ci = 4k for all agents. Moreover, for each variable xi
there is a switch item. The switch item has value 4k for agents 〈xi : 0〉 and 〈xi : 1〉, and value 0 for
every other agent. It serves to capture the assignment of the variable – if xi is set to xi = 1, the switch
item is given to 〈xi : 0〉 (for xi = 0, the switch item goes to 〈xi : 1〉). When given a switch item, an
agent cannot generate value for any additional equation items defined as follows.
For each equation xi + xj + xk = α with α ∈ {0, 1}, we introduce 4 classes of equation items –
one class for each satisfying assignment. In particular, we get class 〈xi : α;xj : α;xk : α〉 as well as
classes 〈xi : α¯, xj : α¯, xk : α〉, 〈xi : α¯, xj : α, xk : α¯〉 and 〈xi : α, xj : α¯, xk : α¯〉. For each of these
classes, we introduce three items. Hence, for each equation we introduce 12 items in total. An item
〈< xi : αi, xj : αj, xk : αk〉 has a value of 1 for the three agents 〈xi : αi〉, 〈xj : αj〉, and 〈xk : αk〉, and
value 0 for every other agent.
It is easy to see that w.l.o.g. every optimal assignment of items to agents assigns all switch items.
Hence, every optimal assignment yields some variable assignment for the underlying instance of Ek-
OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2.
Consider an equation xi+xj +xk = α that becomes satisfied by setting the variables (xi, xj , xk) =
(αi, αj , αk). Then none of the agents 〈xi : αi〉, 〈xj : αj〉, and 〈xk : αk〉 gets a switch item, and we can
assign exactly 4 equation items to each of these agents (for details see [15]). Hence, all 12 equation
items generate additional value. In particular, it follows that if xi is involved in a satisfied equation,
one of its agent gets a switch item, and the other one can receive at least 3 equation items.
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Consider an equation xi+xj+xk = α that becomes unsatisfied by setting the variables (xi, xj , xk) =
(αi, αj , αk). Then for one class of equation items, all agents that value these items have already received
switch items (for details see [15]). This class of items cannot generate additional value. Hence, at most
9 equation items generate additional value. They can assigned to the agents that did not receive
switch items such that each agent receives 3 items. In particular, it follows that if xi is involved in
an unsatisfied equation, one of its agents gets a switch item, and the other one can receive at least 3
equation items. Hence, we can ensure that in every optimal solution the overall Nash social welfare is
never 0.
We now derive a lower bound on the optimal Nash social welfare when (1− ε)m equations can be
satisfied. In this case, we obtain value 4k for n agents that receive the switch items. Moreover, we get
an additional total value of 12m(1− ε) + 9mε generated by the equation items. Note that m = kn/3.
We strive to lower bound the Nash social welfare of such an assignment. For this, it suffices to consider
the assignment indicated above – for each satisfied equation, all incident agents without switch items
get 4 equation items. For each unsatisfied equation, all incident agents without switch items get 3
equation items. To obtain a lower bound on the Nash social welfare, we assume a value of 4k for a
maximum of n(1 − ε) agents, while the others get a value of 3k. Therefore, when an assignment of
items to agents generates Nash social welfare of more than
(
(4k)n · (4k)n(1−ε) · 3knε
)−2n







we take this as an indicator that at least m(1− ε) equations can be fulfilled.
In contrast, now suppose only (1/2 + ε)m equations can be fulfilled. In this case, we obtain value
4k for n agents that receive the switch items. Moreover, we get an additional total value of at most
12m(1/2+ε)+9m(1/2−ε) = 10.5m+3εm generated by the equation items. We strive to upper bound
the Nash social welfare of such an assignment. For this, we assume that all agents that do not receive
a switch item get an equal share of the value generated by equation items, i.e., a share of 3.5k + kε.
Therefore, when an assignment of items to agents generates Nash social welfare of less than
((4k)n · (k(3.5 + ε))n)−2n = k · 4
1
2 · (3.5 + ε)
1
2 ,
we take this as an indicator that at most m(1/2 + ε) equations can be fulfilled.
















we can decide whether the instance of Ek-OCC-MAX-E3-LIN-2 has an optimal assignment with at
least m(1−ε) or at most m(1/2+ε) satisfied equations. This shows that we cannot approximate Nash
social welfare with a factor of
√
8/7 > 1.069 unless P=NP.
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Appendix
A Rounding Trees with Zero Price Goods
In this section, we give an algorithm to round trees T0 ⊆ B0 × G0 of the equilibrium (x,p) to an
integral allocation. Recall that in such trees, all goods have price pj = 0 and all buyers reach their
cap ci. Consider the following procedure which is similar to the procedure in Section 3.2. It uses only
the allocation x and does not rely on prices. In particular, the only price-based assignment rule is in
the preprocessing step, and it can be replaced here with an equivalent, more direct criterion:
Preprocessing: For each zero-price tree component, assign some agent to be a root node. For each
good that has no child-agent, assign it to its parent agent. For each good j, if it has two or more
child agents, then keep only one child agent who buys the largest amount of j. For every other
child agent i, delete the edge (i, j) and make i the root node of the newly created tree. For each
good j, if its child-agent i gets at most half of its total utility from j, i.e., if uijxij ≤ ci/2, then
assign j to its parent agent and make the child agent i the root node of a newly created tree.
Rounding: For each zero-price tree component, do the following recursively: Assign the root agent
a child-good j that gives him the maximum value (among all children goods) in the fractional
solution. Except the subtree rooted at j, assign each good to its child-agent in the remaining
tree. Make the child-agent of good j the root node of the newly created tree.
Prices pj play a role in exactly two places in Section 3.2.
First, when we assign a good j to the parent and drop the child agent i with pj ≤ m
a
i /2, this
ensures that the valuation of agent i in the newly created tree is at least half of the original valuation.
We use this fact to prove Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5. In case of zero price goods, our choice of assigning a
good j to the parent and dropping the child agent i if uijxij ≤ ci/2 is an equivalent notion in terms of
allocation.
Second, in the proof of Lemma 3.6 we argue that a good with price more than 1 is only assigned to
an uncapped agent i which gives agent i at least pj amount of value. Since each agent of B0 is capped,
we do not need this property in Lemma A.3.
As a result, the proofs of the following lemmas are almost completely identical to the proofs of
Lemmas 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, respectively, and hence are omitted.
Lemma A.1. After preprocessing, each tree component T has kT + 1 agents and kT goods, for some
kT > 1. The valuation of the root agent r is at least cr/2. For all other agents i the valuation is at
least ci.
Lemma A.2. After rounding, each agent i that is assigned its parent good obtains a valuation of at
least ci/2.
Consider a zero-price tree T at the beginning of the rounding step with kT +1 agents and kT goods.
Let a1, g1, a2, g2, . . . , al, gl, al+1 be the recursion path in T starting from the root agent a1 and ending
at the leaf agent al+1 such that a1, . . . , al+1 became root agents of the trees formed recursively during
the rounding step, and good gi is assigned to ai in this process, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. We denote by ki the
number of children for agent ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.







k1 · · · kl
·
∏
i∈T
ci .
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